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i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether at least one plaintiff State has standing
to challenge the Executive’s Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program.
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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici scholars are law professors who teach and
write in the field of federal jurisdiction.1 Our purpose
is to support Respondents’ claim to standing while
remaining agnostic as to the other issues in the case.
We hold varying views on the policy merits of the
Executive’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program,
as well as on the legal merits of the States’ separation
of powers and Administrative Procedure Act challenges to that program. We file this brief in our
individual capacities, without purporting to represent
the views of our home institutions.
Jonathan Adler is the inaugural Johan Verheij
Memorial Professor of Law at the Case Western
Reserve University School of Law. Erin Morrow
Hawley is an Associate Professor at the University of
Missouri School of Law. Bradford Mank is the James
B. Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of
Cincinnati College of Law. Garrick Pursley is an
Associate Professor at the Florida State University
College of Law. Ernest A. Young is the Alston & Bird
Professor at Duke Law School.

1

All parties have consented to the filing of this brief by
blanket or individual letter. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.3(a). No counsel
for a party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
person other than amicus curiae, their members, and their
counsel has made monetary contribution to the preparation or
submission of this brief. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.6.

2
Amici Southeastern Legal Foundation (SLF),
founded in 1976, is a national non-profit, public
interest law firm and policy center that advocates
constitutional individual liberties, limited government, and free enterprise. SLF drafts legislative
models, educates the public on key policy issues, and
litigates regularly before the Supreme Court. As an
organization interested in federalism and separation
of powers, SLF has a particular interest in the standing of state governments to assert these principles.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This lawsuit concerns whether the States, which
this Court has recognized “bear[ ] many of the consequences of unlawful immigration,” Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), shall have any voice in
the legal regime that determines who may be lawfully
present within their borders. Our Constitution and
federal statutes provide two primary avenues for
State input: the States’ political representation in
Congress, and the opportunity to participate in
administrative policymaking through the notice and
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. The gravamen of
Respondent States’ claims on the merits in this case
is that both of these avenues have been shut down by
the national Executive’s unilateral action in DAPA.
The United States is thus wrong to say that the
States’ lawsuit asks “the federal courts to resolve

3
complex debates over immigration policy that the
Constitution reserves to the political Branches of the
National Government.” Pet’r Br. at 12. What the
Respondent States ask – and all the court of appeals
order below did – is to force the national Executive to
conduct those “complex debates” in the political and
administrative fora that the Constitution and the
APA demand. The fundamentally process-oriented
nature of Respondent States’ claims on the merits is
essential to understanding what is at stake in the
arguments about Respondents’ standing.
That standing, by this Court’s traditional criteria, is straightforward. The States have largely ceded
to national authorities the ability to determine who is
lawfully present within their own jurisdictions; as a
result, the States’ own governmental responsibilities
necessarily expand and contract in response to changes in national immigration policy. One particularly
concrete instance of this is Texas’s law requiring
issuance of driver’s licenses to all persons that the
national government determines to be lawfully present. DAPA’s expansion of that category increases
Texas’s costs, and that is sufficient for injury in fact.
The United States does not, in fact, challenge the
Respondent States’ standing on traditional grounds.
Instead, it has invented novel requirements without
support in this Court’s cases, such as a broad rule
against “self-inflicted injury.” And it has suggested
that the fact that the plaintiffs here are States should
cut against standing because that somehow transforms a legal dispute over statutory authorization

4
and administrative process into a political controversy. Neither of these departures from this Court’s cases
can withstand scrutiny.
Standing in this case requires no special standing loophole for state governments. It simply requires
recognition that Respondents are governments, with
responsibilities that are in part a function of whom
federal law permits to be lawfully present within
their jurisdictions. Amici take no position on whether
Respondents should prevail on their claims, much
less on what national immigration policy should be.
But there is no doubt that they have standing simply
to demand access to national debates about immigration policy.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

Texas’s straightforward injury in fact
arises directly from its responsibilities as
a state government.

Although Texas alleges a variety of injuries, this
litigation has focused on the expenses the State will
incur on account of DAPA’s expansion of the class of
persons eligible to apply for state driver’s licenses.
The United States has characterized this injury as a
contrivance based on a quirk of state law. That is
unfair and misleading. The point is simply that both
the national and state governments are responsible
for caring for all persons lawfully present within their
jurisdictions. When the national Executive expands

5
that category by deeming over four million unlawfully
present aliens “lawfully present,” Pet. App. 413a, the
costs of governing not only for the national government but also for state and local governments increase drastically. Texas’s driver’s license program is
simply one particularly concrete example of those
increased costs. It is sufficient to answer the standing
question in this case.
A. Texas’s responsibility for issuing driver’s licenses plainly meets this Court’s
test for Article III standing.
Article III requires a concrete injury in fact,
fairly traceable to the challenged government conduct
and redressable by the requested relief. Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997). The costs of issuing
driver’s licenses are plainly concrete and quantifiable
in monetary terms, although this is not required.2 Nor
is the injury widely shared; rather, as a cost of governance, it is shared only by other states with similar
driver’s license regimes.
The United States has not challenged traceability
or redressability here, nor could it do so.3 Because
2

See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998) (finding
“informational injury” based on an agency’s failure to enforce disclosure requirements to be “sufficiently concrete and specific”).
3
The United States’ novel argument that Texas’s injury is
“self-inflicted” does ultimately go to traceability, but it does not
claim that the relation between DAPA and the State’s increased
costs is factually attenuated or uncertain. See infra Part II
(considering the “self-inflicted” argument).

6
standing does not turn on the magnitude of the
impending injury, it does not matter whether all or
even a large number of persons made eligible to
remain in the United States by DAPA apply for Texas
driver’s licenses. The United States does not appear
to dispute that some of those persons will apply for
driver’s licenses,4 and that is sufficient to establish
traceability. And of course if the requested injunction
renders those persons ineligible to apply, Texas will
not incur the costs of issuing them licenses.5
Critically, the district court held a hearing on
these matters and grounded its standing ruling in
specific findings of fact. Those findings of fact concerning the causal connections between DAPA and
Texas’s injury – which were affirmed by the court of
appeals – can be set aside only for clear error.6 The
4

The court of appeals found that “it is apparent that many
would do so.” Pet. App. at 30a.
5
Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524-25 (2007)
(holding that that plaintiffs may attack a government decision
even if it is merely an incremental cause of their injuries, and
even if the requested relief would only incrementally mitigate
those injuries); Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167-68 (holding sufficient to
establish an injury to plaintiffs that the agency was likely to
reduce the amount of water available to all affected parties, even
though it was not yet clear precisely how much plaintiffs’ own
allocation would be reduced).
6
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
564, 573-74 (1985). Much of the Intervenors’ standing discussion
asks this Court to look behind the district court’s finding, see
Brief for Intervenors-Respondents Jane Does in Support of
Petitioner (Intervenor Br.) at 30-32, but Intervenors’ speculation
hardly demonstrates clear error.

7
United States has not argued that any finding by the
district court was clearly erroneous.
The United States argues instead that the cost of
applications for state benefits is “incidental” to the
main purpose of DAPA, which is to determine whom
may remain within the country. That is no doubt true;
no one says the United States embarked upon this
policy with the malign purpose of imposing costs on
state governments. But this Court’s standing cases
recognize no doctrine of “incidental” injury. Government policies frequently inflict harm on parties as a
side effect of the government’s primary policy goal.
The injuries are no less injurious for that, and this
Court has frequently relied upon such injuries in
recognizing standing.7 Respondent States do not lack
standing here simply because their injuries may be
characterized as collateral damage.
B. The cost of issuing driver’s licenses to
DAPA beneficiaries is simply one example of the way DAPA expands the
responsibilities of state governments.
Although the United States characterizes immigration as an area of exclusive federal authority, this

7

See, e.g., Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167-68 (finding injury in fact
where plaintiffs challenged an agency’s opinion on biological
impacts on endangered species, where that would incidentally
result in a reduction in water available for their irrigation
operations).

8
Court’s cases have recognized that the matter is
significantly more complex. This Court struck down
most of Arizona’s effort to ratchet up immigration
enforcement in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012), but it upheld that same State’s measures
limiting employment of undocumented aliens in
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968
(2011).8 State law and policy are intertwined with the
9
federal immigration regime in a variety of ways. And
this Court has acknowledged that States bear many
of the costs of unlawful immigration. See Arizona, 132
S. Ct. at 2500.
More fundamentally, immigration regulation is
unique in that it concerns the scope of the body politic
itself. As Justice Scalia observed in Arizona, “the
power to exclude from the sovereign’s territory people
who have no right to be there” is “the defining characteristic of sovereignty.” 132 S. Ct. at 2511 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). That is because power to determine who
can enter and who can remain impacts every other
function of government. Aliens pervasively interact,
for example, with state laws and policies concerning
healthcare, education, employment, and public safety.
See generally Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
8

See also De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (upholding
state law prohibiting employment of unauthorized aliens). The
United States’ brief cites Arizona v. United States extensively; it
does not acknowledge Whiting or the actual holding of De Canas.
9
See Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in
Immigration Regulation, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567 (2008).

9
Rico, ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982) (observing
that States have an “easily identified” “sovereign interest” in “the exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction”).
Although the States have ceded authority to the
national government to determine who may lawfully
be present within their jurisdictions, that concession
hardly erases the profound impact of those determinations upon legitimate state interests. It is hard to
think of another aspect of federal policy that more
directly affects state governance. To pretend that
States cannot be injured by federal immigration
decisions is to close one’s eyes to the way the world
actually works.
C. Texas does not lack standing as a mere
“beneficiary” of federal regulation.
The United States suggests Texas lacks standing
because it is not directly regulated by federal immigration laws. See Pet’r Br. at 20-22. This argument
fails for two reasons. First and foremost, Texas’s
standing rests on the various ways in which DAPA
affects Texas’s own responsibilities as a governmental
regulator and provider of government benefits. Texas
need not rely on its status as “beneficiary” of federal
regulation for standing. Second, notwithstanding the
United States’ suggestion, no categorical rule bars
beneficiaries of federal regulation from challenging
the national government’s administration of federal
programs.

10
It is certainly true that persons actually subject
to regulatory action nearly always have standing to
challenge that action; their difficulties generally
involve timing of review. And it is also true that
persons challenging governmental regulation of
others have faced higher hurdles to establish standing. But it has never been the case that plaintiffs in
the latter category were categorically excluded from
10
seeking judicial review of government decisions.
Typically, beneficiaries of regulation struggle to
establish standing to challenge agency decisions
because, not being direct subjects of regulation,
their traceability and redressability scenarios involve
a more attenuated string of causal relationships.11
10

See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S.
139, 153-56 (2010) (upholding conventional alfalfa growers’
standing to challenge agency order deregulating geneticallymodified alfalfa on account of possible impacts on their own
crops); Akins, 524 U.S. at 11 (upholding voters’ standing to
challenge FEC’s decision not to enforce registration and reporting requirements against another organization); Clarke v. Sec.
Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987) (holding securities broker
association had standing to challenge agency’s policy regulating
national banks).
11
In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), for example, this
Court denied standing to parents of black children attending
public schools to challenge the Internal Revenue Service’s
alleged failure to deny tax-exempt status to segregated private
schools. Pointing out that neither the private schools nor the
families attending them were parties to the litigation, the Court
held it was too uncertain that the IRS’s decisions had undermined desegregation in the public schools or that reversal of
those decisions would result in a desegregated education for the
plaintiffs’ children. See id. at 756-58.

11
And to the extent that the United States warns of an
avalanche of litigation if the States prevail here,
traceability and redressability are likely to remain
significant obstacles in many contexts. But aside from
asserting that Texas’s injury is self-inflicted, the
United States has not contested that Article III’s
causation requirements are met here. Apart from
those requirements, there is no freestanding re12
striction on claims by regulatory beneficiaries.
In any event, Texas and the other Respondent
States need not rest their standing on their status as
regulatory beneficiaries. To be sure, they do have
interests that fall into that category. Many have
argued that illegal immigration undermines the
interests of legal workers and increases crime, and to
the extent this is true the citizens of Respondent
States benefit from the national government’s enforcement of the immigration law. In their capacity as

12

The United States and its amici cite Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 897 (1984), for the proposition that plaintiffs have no “judicially cognizable interest in procuring enforcement of the immigration laws” against another, Pet’r Br. at
20; Brief for Professor Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners (Dellinger Br.) at 6, but neither acknowledges that Sure-Tan was not a standing case or that this Court
confined its statement to “private persons like petitioners,” who
were employers seeking to disqualify employees from voting in a
union election. 467 U.S. at 897.

12
parens patriae, the States have standing to sue to
protect these interests.13
But Respondent States have an even stronger
direct argument that, as a state government, they
must regulate and, in some cases, provide benefits for
persons the national government allows to enter the
country and is unable or unwilling to remove.14 In this
way, federal action (or inaction) significantly affects
the scope of the States’ own responsibilities. To
equate Texas with the private plaintiffs denied standing in cases like Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614 (1973), see Pet’r Br. at 20, is to ignore the crucial
fact that Texas is also a sovereign entity and that
federal immigration decisions impact the State’s own
governmental obligations.
In this, immigration is arguably unique. Both the
national government and the States must govern the
persons they find within their concurrent jurisdictions. But only the national government can determine who is lawfully here or what steps will be taken
to exclude or remove those who are unlawfully present. Fundamental state interests in the exercise of
their own governmental powers are thus inextricably
13

See Resp’t Br. at 30-34; see, e.g., Bradford Mank, Should
States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?:
Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 1701 (2008).
14
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that
Texas cannot deny free public education to undocumented
school-age children within its borders).

13
tied to federal decisions in this field. None of the
cases cited by the United States, which involve private individuals seeking to challenge government
action or inaction vis-à-vis other private individuals,
raise a comparable concern.
II.

Texas does not lack standing on the
ground that its injury is “self-inflicted.”

The United States’ central standing argument is
that Texas’s injury is “self-inflicted” and therefore
“not a legally cognizable injury or one that is fairly
traceable to the challenged federal policy.” Pet’r Br. at
24. But this Court’s cases recognize no general doctrine of “self-inflicted injury.” On the contrary, the
handful of cases that use that phrase refer to a diverse group of much more limited considerations,
none of which is applicable here. The novel doctrine
proposed by the United States, if adopted by this
Court, would revolutionize standing law. And in any
event, Texas’s injury is not self-inflicted.
A. There is no “self-inflicted injury” rule
under Article III.
Amici scholars have taught and written about
standing for many years without being aware of any
doctrine of “self-inflicted” injury. The closest this
Court has come is Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct.
1138 (2013), which held inter alia that the costs a
plaintiff may incur to avoid the impact of a federal
policy do not constitute the injury in fact needed to

14
challenge that policy if the impact of the policy on
plaintiffs is itself highly uncertain. The Clapper
plaintiffs challenged aspects of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that authorized surveillance of certain individuals outside the United
States. The plaintiffs – who claimed to engage in
communications with persons subject to FISA surveillance – could not demonstrate that they had, in fact,
been subjected to any FISA surveillance; instead,
they relied on the costs they had incurred to avoid the
possibility of such surveillance to establish their
injury. Because these costs arose from the plaintiffs’
concerns that they might be subjected to surveillance,
this Court held that “respondents’ self-inflicted injuries are not fairly traceable to the Government’s
purported activities . . . and their subjective fear of
surveillance does not give rise to standing.” Id. at
1152-53.
Clapper holds, at most, that plaintiffs who cannot
show they are even subject to a government policy
cannot manufacture injury in fact by voluntarily
expending resources in anticipation of being subject
to that policy. That is not the case here, where the
United States cannot and does not dispute that DAPA
will apply to persons in Texas and, as a result, affect
the operation of Texas’s own governmental operations. Clapper, moreover, must be read in conjunction
with other cases recognizing standing based on
injuries that might also be characterized as “selfinflicted.” In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
561 U.S. 139 (2010), for example, this Court held that

15
conventional alfalfa farmers had standing to challenge a federal agency’s decision to deregulate genetically engineered alfalfa. Although it was uncertain
whether the genetically engineered alfalfa would in
fact infect nearby conventional alfalfa farms, the
plaintiffs undertook costly precautions against such
infection. This Court concluded that “[s]uch harms,
which respondents will suffer even if their crops are
not actually infected with the Roundup-ready gene,
are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact
prong of the constitutional standing analysis.” Id. at
155. If there were a general rule against self-inflicted
injuries, then surely Monsanto would have come out
the other way.15
Understandably, the United States does not rely
primarily on Clapper (and does not mention Monsanto). Instead, its best case is Pennsylvania v. New Jersey,
426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam).16 That case considered two separate motions for leave to file complaints
in this Court’s original jurisdiction concerning taxation
15

Clapper distinguished Monsanto on the ground that the
farmers presented “concrete evidence to substantiate their
fears,” as opposed to “mere conjecture about possible governmental actions.” 133 S. Ct. at 1154. This confirms that the
problem in Clapper was rooted in the uncertainty that the
challenged government action would ever apply to the plaintiffs,
thus rendering their precautionary expenditures not only selfinflicted but superfluous. Given the evidentiary record and
district court findings here, the present case is much closer to
Monsanto than Clapper.
16
See, e.g., Pet’r Br. at 25 (“Pennsylvania controls.”).

16
by one state that allegedly injured other states. The
entirety of the relevant discussion in this Court’s
opinion is as follows:
In neither of the suits at bar has the defendant State inflicted any injury upon the
plaintiff States through the imposition of the
taxes held, in No. 69, and alleged, in No. 68,
to be unconstitutional. The injuries to the
plaintiffs’ fiscs were self-inflicted, resulting
from decisions by their respective state legislatures. Nothing required Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont to extend a tax credit to
their residents for income taxes paid to New
Hampshire, and nothing prevents Pennsylvania from withdrawing that credit for taxes
paid to New Jersey. No State can be heard to
complain about damage inflicted by its own
hand.
Id. at 664. This cursory discussion is the rock upon
which the United States rests its “self-inflicted injury” argument.
Pennsylvania simply cannot bear the weight that
the United States would place upon it here. The only
use of the term “standing” in the opinion occurs in the
Court’s later discussion of Pennsylvania’s additional
parens patriae claim on behalf of its citizens. Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665-66. The Court rejected that
claim based on other grounds having nothing to do
with self-inflicted injury, and the United States does
not appear to rely on that part of the opinion here.

17
Amici submit that the remainder of Pennsylvania’s discussion is best read as not concerning Article
III standing at all, but rather as an application of this
Court’s standard for exercising its original jurisdiction. In Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73 (1992),
this Court explained that “[r]ecognizing the delicate
and grave character of our original jurisdiction, we
have interpreted the Constitution and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) as making our original jurisdiction obligatory only in appropriate cases, and as providing us with
substantial discretion to make case-by-case judgments as to the practical necessity of an original
forum in this Court.” Id. at 76 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). One criterion is that “it
must appear that the complaining State has suffered
a wrong through the action of the other State,” Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15 (1939), and it is
evidently this requirement that concerned the Court
in Pennsylvania. Certainly there is conceptual overlap between this requirement and Article III injury in
fact, but the original jurisdiction cases do not invoke
Article III and there is no reason to believe that the
standards are the same.17 As the Wright & Miller
treatise puts it, “[t]he special concerns that have
guided the Court in this area [original jurisdiction]
17

The standard for this Court’s original jurisdiction seems
rather higher than the standard for Article III injury in fact. See,
e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 571 n.18 (1983) (“The
model case for invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction is a
dispute between States of such seriousness that it would amount
to casus belli if the States were fully sovereign.”).
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are unique to its own jurisdictional problems, and do
not provide a sure basis for analogous reasoning in
other areas of state standing.”18
In any event, the novel requirement proposed by
the United States would have radical implications for
standing doctrine. The United States suggests that
an injury is self-inflicted, and therefore unable to
support standing, any time it could have been avoided
if the plaintiff had taken some further action. That
radical doctrine would eliminate standing in any
number of landmark decisions of this Court. The
plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), could have avoided the injury of segregation
by homeschooling their children, for example. But
because the laws in question were unconstitutional,
the plaintiffs were not required to alter their affairs
to avoid them.
Most injuries can be avoided by some action or
other; the question is whether the plaintiff could have
so easily avoided its injury that it lacks any real
19
Certainly the
personal stake in the dispute.
justiciability rules do not require the States to take
evasive action at all costs to avoid injury at the hands
of federal law. When a state law has been held invalid
18

Richard D. Freer & Edward H. Cooper, 13B Federal
Practice & Procedure § 3531.11.1 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database
updated April 2015).
19
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)
(observing that “the standing question is whether the plaintiff has
alleged . . . a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy”).
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on federal constitutional grounds, for example, the
state has standing to appeal that judgment based on
the injury that inheres in not being able to enforce its
law;20 no one says that this injury is “self-inflicted”
because the state did not have to enact its law in the
first place. Texas was not required here to alter its
legal regime to accommodate a change in federal law
that injured it, without first having the opportunity
to challenge the validity of that federal change. See,
e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601 (recognizing a State’s “sovereign interest” in “the power to
create and enforce a legal code”).21
B. Texas’s injury is not “self-inflicted.”
Even if this Court were to adopt a rule foreclosing standing based on “self-inflicted” injuries, no
plausible version of that rule would cover Texas’s
claim here. Texas adopted its policy of permitting all
persons legally present in its jurisdiction to apply for
driver’s licenses long before DAPA, foreclosing any
claim that it adopted the policy as a post hoc attempt
to manufacture standing for its challenge to DAPA.
20

See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (permitting
a state government intervenor to appeal a judgment invalidating a state law because “a State clearly has a legitimate interest
in the continued enforceability of its own statutes”).
21
See also Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues other than
Global Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 1, 7 (2007) (noting
that “the state . . . has a sovereign interest in preserving its own
law” that “should be sufficient for Article III purposes”).
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Compare Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151 (“[R]espondents
cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting
harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”).22
More fundamentally, Texas’s reliance on the federal
definition of lawful presence was entirely appropriate, given the primary role that federal authorities
play in the immigration field.
As a border state with a large immigrant population (both lawful and unlawful), Texas must address
which members of this population are eligible for
state benefits and services. Given the national government’s primary authority over immigration, it is
natural for the States to defer to federal decisions as
to who is lawfully present when making these decisions. Texas has not made some sort of idiosyncratic
choice here; it has not pulled out some obscure provision of federal law and made it the touchstone of
eligibility for state benefits. Rather, it has simply
decided that, given the federal government’s primary
role in determining who may lawfully enter the
country and whom it will undertake to remove,
anyone federal authorities authorize to remain will be
eligible for certain state benefits. Indeed, given the
United States’ repeated emphasis on its exclusive
authority over these matters,23 it is decidedly odd for
it to criticize Texas for relying on federal definitions.
22

It is only on this narrow point that Clapper cited Pennsylvania. See id.
23
See, e.g., Pet’r Brief at 13, 19-20.
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Adopting the United States’ position on “self-inflicted”
injury would create perverse incentives for states to
adopt their own definitions of lawful presence for
purposes of state law, in order to protect themselves
from unexpected changes in the federal regime that
states would lack standing to challenge.
Critically, the United States has taken the position that States are not free to adopt their own definitions that diverge from federal immigration policy. As
Texas notes, Resp’t Br. at 23 n.20, the United States
argued to the Ninth Circuit that because federal
power over immigration is exclusive, “a State generally may not establish classifications that distinguish
among aliens whom the federal government has treated
similarly.”24 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that
both the Equal Protection Clause and (probably)
federal preemption precluded Arizona (a respondent
in the present case) from “target[ing] DACA recipients for disparate treatment.” Ariz. DREAM Act Coal.
v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2014).
Amici take no position on whether either the United
States’ or the Ninth Circuit’s views are correct. But
surely it is a reasonable course for state governments
to avoid these potential conflicts with federal law by
incorporating federal definitions in this sensitive

24

United States’ Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellees, at 8 in Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 1515307, U.S. App. LEXIS 14423 (9th Cir. Aug. 2015). See also J.A.
309.
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field. Such accommodation should hardly be characterized as “self-inflicted injury.”
The special role of federal law in the immigration
context resolves the United States’ concern that state
governments will gratuitously incorporate elements
of federal law on any number of subjects into their
own legal regimes, then use that incorporation as
leverage to challenge federal policy. Whether or not
that hypothetical is a plausible expectation of how
state governments are likely to employ their own
limited resources, the field of immigration law is
unique on account of federal law’s primary role.
Although state income tax regimes frequently incorporate the federal definition of taxable income, see
Pet’r Br. at 32, for example, it is well-settled that the
national government lacks exclusive or even primary
authority over taxation.25 State incorporation is a
matter of convenience. If this Court wished to limit
state standing to challenge changes in federal law
that trigger effects under state law, it could sensibly
draw the line between gratuitous incorporation of
this kind and incorporation that is arguably compelled, such as federal immigration law’s definition of
lawful presence.26
25

See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
425 (1819).
26
Amici do not say such a line is essential. Many other
constraints limit improvident state challenges, such as resource
and political constraints or the possible lack of a cause of action
or substantive legal basis for challenging a change in federal tax
policy.
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The United States’ amicus make the extraordinary claim that it does not actually matter whether
Texas can change its eligibility criteria for driver’s
licenses: “That there may be constitutional or other
limits on Texas’s options for changing its driver’slicense program to avoid its self-imposed ‘harm’ does
not change the analysis.” Dellinger Br. at 15. This is
because “[t]hose exogenous constraints do not arise
from the Guidance and are therefore not relevant to
the question of respondents’ standing to challenge it.”
Id.27 But amicus can hardly be arguing that the
Respondent States’ challenge is better directed at the
Supremacy or Equal Protection Clauses. If federal
statutory or constitutional law makes state incorporation of federal immigration law non-optional, then
injuries arising from changes in federal immigration
rules are simply not “self-inflicted.”
In any event, DAPA presented Texas with a
range of choices, each of which constituted cognizable
injury. It could have adopted its own definition of
which aliens are eligible for driver’s licenses, risking
a constitutional challenge and imposing distinctions
among aliens that Texas itself may have viewed as
unfair; it could have, as the United States insists,
27

The United States’ amici assert that the dormant Commerce Clause would have prevented Pennsylvania changing its
tax scheme in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey. Dellinger Br. at 15-16
& n.7. The Pennsylvania Court’s cursory discussion of “selfinflicted” injury did not consider this point, which underscores
that that case should not be read as sub silentio articulating a
fundamental principle of standing doctrine.
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raised the fees for driver’s license applications to
cover its additional costs, which would have entailed
either increasing costs for persons it had previously
chosen to assist or imposing potentially problematic
distinctions among them; or it could have taken no
action and simply absorbed the cost of additional
driver’s license applications. The important point is
that each of these choices either involves additional
costs or legislative action departing from Texas’s
preferred legal regime. Each option, in other words,
would amount to a concrete injury in fact. And so the
fact that DAPA presented Texas with a choice among
bad options cannot make its injury “self-inflicted.”
III. Recognizing state standing here will
vindicate – not disrupt – our constitutional structure.
The United States remarkably asserts that “[i]n
the immigration context alone, the court of appeals’
theory would give States virtually unfettered ability
to conscript courts into entertaining their complaints
about federal policies.” Pet’r Br. at 31. And it worries
that “States could interfere with the federal government’s administration of the law in many other
contexts as well.” Id. at 32. This rhetoric presupposes
a conclusion. Parties with valid injuries in fact do not
“conscript” courts into hearing their legal claims, and
valid claims that a federal agency has exceeded its
statutory authority or omitted necessary procedural
steps do not “interfere” with federal administration.
But the United States may be making a broader point

25
about the separation of powers – that is, that major
public controversies should not be resolved in court,
especially not at the behest of institutional actors like
state governments.
Article III, of course, contains no exception for
major controversies, and any rule that sought to
distinguish between major and minor disputes would
be hopelessly indeterminate. Moreover, nothing in
Article III limits the rights of States to pursue their
own claims in federal fora.28 Instead, this Court has
said States are “entitled to special solicitude in our
standing analysis.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007). States are, in fact, particularly appropriate litigants for aggregating the diffuse interests at
stake in controversies like this one. And precisely
because they are governments, the States suffer more
concrete harms.
Critically, the gravamen of Respondent States’
claims on the merits in this case is that the ordinary
processes for resolving policy disputes about immigration or other issues have been cut off by the federal Executive’s unilateral action. The States are
28

One perverse consequence of the United States’ position
would be to encourage States to litigate these sorts of disputes in
their own courts. If the United States is right about Article III
standing, then these cases would not be removable to federal
court, and it is unclear that the state courts would lack authority to issue some relief. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F.
Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, & David L. Shapiro, Hart and
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 435-37
(7th ed. 2015) (noting continuing uncertainty).
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politically represented in Congress, but the States’
claim is that the Executive has circumvented the
legislative process here. And States are entitled to
participate in the administrative process as well, but
the States argue that the federal Executive has prevented that by denying notice and comment under
the APA. These aspects of the case both make the
States’ standing particularly pressing here and provide potential limiting principles in future litigation.
A. The States are effective litigants for
vindicating diffuse interests.
Massachusetts v. EPA’s “special solicitude” for
States’ standing makes sound functional sense,
because States will often be uniquely appropriate
litigants for certain sorts of claims. States can play
this role, moreover, without requiring this Court to
recognize any special rule of standing for state litigants. All that is necessary is to recognize that States
are governments, and governments have interests
and responsibilities that private litigants may not
share.
One of the most difficult problems in federal
practice and procedure concerns the appropriate
mechanisms for aggregating claims that affect large
numbers of people but that individual litigants lack
the incentives or the wherewithal to pursue. Standing
doctrine often creates or exacerbates the aggregation
problem. Here, for example, the persons most directly
affected by DAPA are the unlawfully present aliens
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granted legal presence. These persons, of course, are
unlikely to challenge the program. But the natural
persons arguably injured by DAPA – the voters whose
representatives voted for the federal statutes that
DAPA arguably transgresses, or the federal and state
taxpayers whose resources will be diverted to pay
DAPA’s significant expenses – lack individual standing under settled law.
Our law has adopted a number of solutions –
such as class actions or organizational standing – for
aggregating claims that are impracticable to bring on
an individual basis. But these mechanisms all have
their problems, and none addresses the lack of individual standing when injuries occur to diffuse public
interests. States, however, are empowered by state
constitutions and the Tenth Amendment to represent
the diffuse public interest of their citizens.
One significant advantage that States have over
private organizations and class actions is that they
have built-in mechanisms of democratic accountability for their conduct of litigation on behalf of their
citizens.29 Justices of this Court have complained that
the use of “private attorneys general” to enforce
federal law raises significant problems of public
accountability, and similar concerns exist about
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tion).

Mank, supra, at 1784 (discussing checks on state litiga-
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accountability of class counsel in class actions.30 State
officials who sue on behalf of their citizens are politically accountable for their actions, however. A recent
re-election campaign by the Texas Attorney General,
for example, featured public debate about the appropriateness of the State’s participation in litigation
challenging the Affordable Care Act.31
Litigation by States fits well into a constitutional
system predicated on the notion that no one person or
institution can lay a unique claim to the public interest. Our system of both vertical and horizontal checks
and balances recognizes that the public benefits when
multiple institutions can step in if a particular officer
or agency fails to pursue the public welfare or respect
legal constraints. Even in an area of strong national
interest like immigration, the national Executive is
not, and cannot be, judge in its own case. By according “special solicitude” to States’ standing, Massachusetts v. EPA facilitated States’ valuable role in the
process by which every political institution is held
accountable to the rule of law.
30

See, e.g., Akins, 524 U.S. at 36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing private attorneys general); In re GMC Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 788 (3d Cir.
1995) (noting concern about lack of accountability of class
counsel).
31
See Chuck Lindell, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott
Opposes Federal Government on Many Fronts, Austin AmericanStatesman, Aug. 7, 2010, available at http://www.statesman.
com/news/texaspolitics/texas-attorney-general-greg-abbott-opposesfederal-government-847623.html?printArticle=y.
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DAPA’s impact on the public is diffuse. But
because States, as governments, are immediately
responsible for governing whomever the national
government decides to allow to remain within the
country, States suffer direct and immediate consequences. The cost of issuing driver’s licenses, as we
have said and the district court found, is only the
most salient example.
B. The government action challenged here
has cut off States’ ordinary political
and administrative remedies.
Throughout their submissions, the United States
and its amici assert that this dispute should be
reserved to the national political branches. See, e.g.,
Pet’r Br. at 12. There is a deep irony to this claim,
because the essence of the States’ argument is that
the national Executive has circumvented the political
and administrative processes that would otherwise
give States a voice. These processes include the
ordinary legislative process in Congress, which represents the States, as well as the APA’s notice and comment procedure, which would ordinarily afford affected
States an opportunity for direct participation.
This Court recognized in Snapp that “the State
has an interest in securing observance of the terms
under which it participates in the federal system.”
458 U.S. at 607-08. And the federalism jurisprudence
has long acknowledged that “the principal means
chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the

30
States in the federal system lies in the structure of
the Federal Government itself ” – particularly the
representation of the States in Congress. Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550
(1985).32 This Court has given life to these “political
safeguards” of federalism by insisting that Congress
make the crucial decisions that affect important state
interests.33 Whether or not these political safeguards
are sufficient to obviate the need for judicial enforcement of other constitutional limits on national authority, doctrines protecting Congress’s role have been
34
critical to sustaining our federal structure.
It is thus crucial that States have standing to
complain when Congress – and therefore States
representation in that body – is cut out of the loop. If
States have standing to make no other constitutional
objection, they must nonetheless be allowed to make
this one. Because Congress’s role supplies the bulwark protection for state interests, the circumvention
of the legislative process that Respondent States
32

See also Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543
(1954).
33
See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991)
(“[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the
political process the protection of the States against intrusive
exercises of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, we must be
absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise.”).
34
See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1349 (2001).
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allege here works a unique injury to their interests.
And the United States cannot be heard to argue that
this dispute over immigration policy should be deferred to political resolution when the national Executive has made an end-run around that very political
process in which Respondent States would otherwise
have been represented.
The other possible avenue for state participation
in a policy debate over immigration would be through
the notice and comment procedure guaranteed by the
APA. To be sure, the APA puts state commenters on
the same plane as any private party, rather than
affording them the structural representation they
receive in the national legislative process. But at
least notice and comment is a form of participation.
Respondent States claim here that they have been
wrongfully denied that very opportunity to participate. Whatever other claims the States may or may
not have standing to bring, they must at least have
standing to challenge the decision to foreclose their
participation in administrative decisions that cause
them concrete injury.
The political process to which the United States
asks this Court to defer, therefore, is simply the
internal deliberations of the national Executive
Branch. The Executive would be judge in its own
case, having cut off both legislative debate and participatory agency deliberation. Having been excluded
from the avenues of participation ordinarily open to
them, the Respondent States must at a minimum
have standing to challenge their exclusion.
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IV. The Respondent States have standing under
the APA.
The United States argues that the Respondent
States lack standing because they do not fall within
the zone of interests of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. Pet’r Br. at
33-36. On its own terms, this argument rests on an
overly cramped reading of the INA’s purposes. But in
any event, the United States misconceives the relevant legal provisions for its zone of interests argument. Respondent States have raised claims not only
that DAPA is inconsistent with the INA, but also that
the Executive has failed to meet its obligations under
the notice and comment provisions of the APA and the
Take Care Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Standing to
bring those claims turns on the respective zones of
interests of those provisions, not the INA.
The Respondent States have sued under Section
10 of the APA, which provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Speaking of this
language, then-judge Scalia observed that “[t]he zone
of interests adequate to sustain judicial review is
particularly broad in suits to compel federal agency
compliance with law, since Congress itself has pared
back traditional prudential limitations by the [APA].”
FAIC Sec., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 357
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(D.C. Cir. 1985) (internal quotation omitted).35 More
recently, he wrote for this Court that “in the APA
context, . . . the [zone of interests] test is not ‘especially demanding.’ ” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1389 (2014) (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012)). “In
that context,” the Lexmark Court explained, “we have
often ‘conspicuously included the word ‘arguably’ in
the test to indicate that the benefit of any doubt goes
to the plaintiff,’ and have said that the test ‘forecloses
suit only when a plaintiff ’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed
that’ Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.” Id.
(quoting Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2210).
The United States cannot make that showing
here. Its argument is that “Respondents cannot
satisfy this [zone of interests] requirement because no
relevant statute protects a State from bearing the
costs of a voluntary state-law subsidy for driver’s
licenses.” Pet’r Br. at 34. Aside from conflating zone of
interests with their self-inflicted injury argument, the
United States’ assertion runs directly counter to this
Court’s repeated admonition that “[w]e do not require
any ‘indication of congressional purpose to benefit the
would-be plaintiff.’ ” Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2210
35

In Akins, 524 U.S. at 19, this Court said that “[h]istory
associates the word ‘aggrieved’ with a congressional intent to
cast the standing net broadly.”
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(quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399-400). The question,
in other words, is whether issues concerning who may
lawfully remain in the United States, and the extent
to which immigration imposes obligations on affected
governments, fall within the scope of the INA.36 That
question answers itself.
The scope of the INA is not the question, however, when it comes to Respondents’ claims under the
Take Care Clause and the notice and comment provisions of the APA.37 The United States is correct that
when a party sues under the general provisions of the
APA to challenge the consistency of agency action
with some other statute, such as the INA, then the
relevant zone of interests concerns that other statute.
But the right to notice and comment is created by the
APA itself; for suits seeking to enforce that requirement, then, the APA both creates the cause of action
and the underlying procedural right to be enforced.
As this Court recognized in Lexmark, “[w]hether a
plaintiff comes within the ‘zone of interests’ is an
36

Cf. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2210 n.7 (recognizing that
Indian Reorganization Act, authorizing acquisition of land for
Indian tribes, was not meant to benefit non-Indian landowners
who live nearby, but holding that the zone of interests question
was simply “whether issues of land use (arguably) fall within
[the IRA’s] scope – because if they do, a neighbor complaining
about such use may sue to enforce the statute’s limits”).
37
Even if Respondents’ notice and comment claim had to
fall within the zone of interests of the INA itself, it would surely
do so. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508 (“Consultation between
federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system.”).
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issue that requires us to determine . . . whether a
legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a
particular plaintiff ’s claim.” 134 S. Ct. at 1387.
Respondents are entitled to sue because they are
“aggrieved,” 5 U.S.C. § 702, by the denial of their
procedural rights under 5 U.S.C. § 553. And there is
no doubt that the latter provision embodies broad
interests in participation by persons affected by agen38
cy action.
Government entities whose own regulatory
responsibilities will be affected by national agency
action fall squarely within the zone of interests
protected by the APA notice and comment requirement.39 A recent Eighth Circuit decision provides a
good example. In Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711
F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2013), local governments challenged an EPA action for effectively making new
legislative rules without notice and comment in
violation of procedural requirement in both the Clean
Water Act (CWA) and the APA. Ruling that the cities
had established Article III standing, the court of
appeals recognized that “[t]he League’s members
have a concrete interest not only in being able to meet
38

See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316
(1979) (“In enacting the APA, Congress made a judgment that
notions of fairness and informed administrative decisionmaking
require that agency decisions be made only after affording
interested persons notice and an opportunity to comment.”).
39
See generally Comment, State Standing to Challenge
Federal Administrative Action: A Re-Examination of the Parens
Patriae Doctrine, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1069, 1094-1103 (1977).

36
their regulatory responsibilities but in avoiding
regulatory obligations above and beyond those that
can be statutorily imposed upon them. Notice and
comment procedures for EPA rulemaking under the
CWA were undoubtedly designed to protect the concrete interests of such regulated entities by ensuring
that they are treated with fairness and transparency
after due consideration and industry participation.”
40
Id. at 871.
The analysis concerning Respondents’ Take Care
claim is similar. The United States makes two arguments concerning the Take Care Clause relevant to
justiciability. The first is that this claim raises a
nonjusticiable political question because “to undertake such an inquiry would express a ‘lack of the
respect due’ to the Nation’s highest elected official.”
Pet’r Br. at 73 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
217 (1962)). Courts do not dismiss constitutional
claims on the ground that they are disrespectful to
the government, of course, and no decision of this
Court has ever found a case nonjusticiable on this
ground.
The second argument is that the Take Care
Clause does not furnish a cause of action. But as
Respondents note, Resp’t Br. at 73, there is a long

40

Although the quoted language emphasized notice and
comment procedures in the CWA, the plaintiff cities also sued
under the APA and the court cited this Court’s APA cases. See
711 F.3d at 871 (citing Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 316).
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history of equitable relief against executive officials
acting in violation of law, and in any event it is unclear why the APA would not also provide a vehicle
for a Take Care claim. In the latter situation, the
relevant question would be whether plaintiffs fell
within the zone of interests of the Take Care Clause
itself, not the INA. Whether the Take Care Clause
creates enforceable rights and the exact contours of
the obligations it imposes on the Executive are, to be
sure, difficult questions. But if there are problems
with Respondents’ Take Care claim, they do not arise
from the zone of interests doctrine.
It is true that many potential plaintiffs fall
within the zone of interests of the APA’s notice and
comment provisions and the Take Care Clause as we
have construed them. But that simply reflects the
fact that the zone of interest test is “not especially
demanding,” Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389, especially
in the APA context. The more important constraints
arise from Article III. Given the Respondent States’
allegation of a concrete injury in fact under the
constitutional standard, the zone of interests arguments raise no additional bar here.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit should be affirmed insofar as it upheld
the States’ standing to sue in this matter.
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